Time Discounting and Economic Decision-making among the Elderly by Huffman, David et al.
Time Discounting and Economic Decision-making 
among the Elderly 
David Huffman, Raimond Maurer, and Olivia S. Mitchell 
Working Paper 
WP 2016-347 
 
Project #:  UM16-14 
 
Time Discounting and Economic Decision-making  
among the Elderly 
David Huffman 
University of Pittsburgh 
Raimond Maurer 
Goethe University 
Olivia S. Mitchell 
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania  
September 2016 
Michigan Retirement Research Center 
University of Michigan 
P.O. Box 1248 
Ann Arbor, MI 48104 
www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu 
(734) 615-0422 
Acknowledgements 
The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security 
Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium through the University of 
Michigan Retirement Research Center Award RRC08098401. The opinions and conclusions expressed 
are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of the 
federal government. Neither the United States government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their 
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the 
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the contents of this report. Reference herein to any specific 
commercial product, process or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not 
necessarily constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States 
government or any agency thereof. 
Regents of the University of Michigan 
Michael J. Behm, Grand Blanc; Mark J. Bernstein, Ann Arbor; Laurence B. Deitch, Bloomfield Hills; Shauna Ryder 
Diggs, Grosse Pointe; Denise Ilitch, Bingham Farms; Andrea Fischer Newman, Ann Arbor; Andrew C. Richner, 
Grosse Pointe Park; Katherine E. White, Ann Arbor; Mark S. Schlissel, ex officio  
Time Discounting and Economic Decision-making among the Elderly 
Abstract 
This research project evaluates the extent of heterogeneity in time discounting among elderly 
Americans, as well as its role in explaining older peoples’ key behaviors. We first show how 
older Americans evaluate simple (hypothetical) intertemporal choices in which payments now 
are compared with payments in the future. This adds to the literature on time horizon 
experiments by focusing on a nationally representative sample of persons age 70+. Using the 
indicators derived from this experiment, we show how differences in discounting patterns are 
associated with characteristics of particular importance in elderly populations, such as serious 
health and mental conditions. We then relate our discounting measure to key outcome variables 
including wealth, the timing of retirement, investments in health, and decisions about end-of-life 
care. 
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Many economic and psychological studies have sought to explore how people make 
inter-temporal decisions, but most previous research on impatience and its impact on economic 
and other outcomes has focused mainly on younger individuals (c.f., Burks et al., 2009; Chabris 
et al., 2008; Schreiber and Weber, 2015; Sutter and Kocher, 2013). Yet understanding how older 
individuals make decisions with intertemporal dimensions is of importance, inasmuch this is 
when many people make critical financial decisions that affect the remainder of their lives. 
Examples include how much to save and spend, when to work versus claim Social Security 
benefits, whether and how much to invest in health and health insurance, whether to sell one’s 
home and move, and many other factors central to retirement well-being.  
There is also little known about the extent of heterogeneity in discount rates amount the 
elderly, and how such diversity might relate to personal characteristics. If time discounting varies 
systematically with demographic or cultural characteristics, this could have important 
implications for how economic outcomes vary for the elderly within society. Moreover, 
discounting could potentially change in old age, something that can only be studied in with data 
on elderly individuals. Aging involves reduced life expectancy, and lower probability of survival 
could potentially affect discounting of the future. Empirical evidence on whether and how life 
expectancy affects discounting, however, is scarce.1  Some aspects of cognitive functioning also 
become increasingly difficult at older ages, in the form of dementia, but little is known about 
how this might affect intertemporal decision-making. For all of these reasons, it is of interest to 
delve into questions about the determinants of time discounting among the older population. 
In this paper we present and analyze time discounting metrics measured in a 
representative sample of individuals age 70 and older. To this end, we use a purpose-built survey 
module we devised for the 2014 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to examine the levels of                                                         
1  One exception is Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey (2013), who show that individuals who are diagnosed with 
Huntington’s disease at an early age make decisions consistent with greater discounting of the future. Sunde and 
Dohmen (2016) have a nice recent review of preferences and aging, but they focus mainly on risk attitudes and not 
time preferences as we do here. 
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and heterogeneity in time discounting among the elderly, and we study how this heterogeneity 
varies with personal characteristics.  Moreover, we leverage the rich information about 
retirement, wealth accumulation, and health behaviors reported in the HRS to evaluate how and 
whether such heterogeneity helps explain differences in important economic behaviors across 
older individuals. 
To preview results on heterogeneity and determinants, we show that the mean (median) 
value of the implied Internal Rate of Return (IRR) used by our older population to discount 
future payments is 0.54 (0.58), with a standard deviation of 0.35.2  Our IRR measures rise with 
age: Thus, a 15-year increase in age from 70 to 85 would be associated with about a standard 
deviation higher IRR. This result is robust to a variety of controls. We also show that Whites and 
the better-educated have lower IRRs. Serious health conditions, which imply reduced life 
expectancy, are associated with 11-30 percent higher IRRs. Cognition scores are not statistically 
associated with our impatience measures, controlling for education. An indicator for dementia, 
however, is associated with significantly higher IRRs.  
When we relate our impatience measures to outcomes of interest using multiple 
regression models, several interesting results emerge. Net wealth is significantly lower for the 
least patient, probably indicating that the least patient save less and therefore arrive at old age 
with fewer assets. We also find that the impatient are much less likely to engage in healthy 
behaviors and to have made provision for end-of-life challenges. And finally, our analysis shows 
that Social Security claiming ages are not significantly related to the IRRs. We check robustness 
of the results to using an Impatience Index, which combines the IRR measure with a more 
subjective measure of impatience, and reach similar conclusions. 
                                                        
2 The IRR is the interest rate that sets equal the net present value of the future money amount and the money amount 
offered today.  
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The next section offers a brief literature review. Then we outline our methodology, and 
the subsequent section provides descriptive statistics regarding the mean and dispersion of 
discounting among the elderly. In a final analytic section, we review the association between 
several economic and health outcomes, and the measured discount rates we derive. A final 
section concludes. 
Background 
Economic theory holds that time discounting plays a crucial role in decision-making 
about inter-temporal tradeoffs. Thus over the life cycle, people must decide to consume less than 
their incomes when young and save and accumulate retirement assets, which they can then draw 
down to support old-age consumption. Nevertheless, everyone is not homogeneous. That is, 
those who discount the future more will place a higher value on current versus future 
consumption, which in turn will prompt them to save less and possibly run out of money in old 
age. Similarly, someone who discounts the future very heavily might claim Social Security 
benefits earlier, thus committing himself to lower old-age payments the rest of his life. And 
people who downweight the future can also make decisions about their own health, insurance, 
and other financial products, that may expose them to greater risks in old age.  
Accordingly, we seek to determine the extent of time discounting among the elderly. 
Additionally, we investigate whether such preferences can help explain heterogeneity in a wide 
range of decisions, including how long to work, whether to invest in one’s own health, whether 
to purchase long-term care or life insurance, and what provisions to make regarding the end of 
one’s life. Extreme levels of impatience may also be an indicator of self-control problems, in the 
sense of present-biased preferences (Rabin, 2002), so these might help predict preference 
reversals, for example, individuals stopping work earlier than they had previously planned.  
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The present research therefore provides evidence on time discounting patterns among 
Americans age 70 and older. With our survey, we also examine the cross-sectional association 
between time discounting and respondent characteristics to explore population heterogeneity in 
impatience. To the extent individuals’ attitudes toward time discounting are quite persistent over 
time, the measures of discounting that we elicit among older respondents may also be useful for 
explaining decisions made earlier in life. These include, for example, saving decisions resulting 
in more or less wealth in retirement.3  
Methods 
We have designed and implemented a survey module in the 2014 HRS to elicit time 
discounting among older adults. Specifically, we gave respondents older than 70 who were 
randomly selected to respond to this module a list of money choices where they considered 
receiving different payments at different points in time. The decision in the inter-temporal choice 
exercise was between “$100 today” and some larger amount $Y that would be received 12 
months in the future (see Online Appendix A for the precise wording of the module).  
Everyone taking the survey module first received a choice between a hypothetical 
payment of $100 today versus a delayed payment of $154 12 months from today. If the 
respondent responded that he preferred the later payment, he was shown a smaller delayed 
amount. If, however, the respondent favored the early payment, he was shown a larger delayed 
amount. Several such choices were provided until each respondent had indicated the value of Y 
(or equivalently, the implied annual rate of return) to which he was indifferent, when comparing 
receiving $100 now versus waiting 12 months. In this way, we obtained an indicator of each 
respondent’s implied internal rate of return.4  
                                                        
3 Meier and Sprenger (2015) report stability in peoples’ attitudes toward time discounting over a time span of two 
years, but Dohmen et al. (2010) report some fluidity over the life cycle. 
4 See Online Appendix B for detail on the computation method. 
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Our values in the choice exercise were chosen to match the magnitudes of rewards used 
in typical intertemporal choice experiments that are the gold standard for measuring time 
discounting. 5   Falk et al. (2014) showed that the survey measure we use is a strong and 
significant predictor of time discounting in such choice experiments.6 Furthermore, Falk et al. 
(2015) found that the survey discounting measure they used predicted important outcomes such 
as savings and human capital accumulation in young population samples around the world. That 
evidence provides confidence that our survey measure does capture a trait that determines 
behavior under real stakes, despite the hypothetical payments and particular parameter values.7  
Our HRS survey module also asked each respondent questions about his self-reported Future 
Oriented Score. This survey measure was also found by Falk et al. (2015) to correlate with 
behavior in incentivized intertemporal choice experiments, and add explanatory power when 
combined with the choice exercise into a single impatience index. Accordingly, we check 
robustness of results to using such an impatience index. The survey also included a question 
aimed specifically at capturing present-bias and dynamically inconsistent preferences, which 
asked about postponing. The latter measure provides a Procrastinator Score for each respondent.8  
                                                        
5 See Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) for a seminal paper on using choice experiments to measure individual 
discount rates in a representative sample. The experiments measure time discounting under a set of assumptions. 
One key assumption required for the experiments to provide an index of impatience is that individuals treat the 
monetary rewards like consumption opportunities.  
6 Falk et al. (2014) had subjects participate in incentivized intertemporal choice experiments and also answer a 
battery of different survey questions about time discounting. The survey measure we use is based on one of the best 
predictors of choices in those incentivized experiments (a measure that is part of the Falk et al. Preference Survey 
Module). 
7 While the magnitudes of monetary payments used in the measure are small relative to typical lifetime income, it is 
well documented that individuals exhibit considerable heterogeneity in their preferences about timing of such 
rewards, and this heterogeneity is correlated with large-stakes intertemporal choices (Falk et al., 2015). 
8 The Future Oriented Score is measured by the respondent’s answer to the following question: “How do you see 
yourself: are you a person who is generally willing to give up something today in order to benefit from that in the 
future, or are you not willing to do so? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely 
unwilling to give up something today’ and a 10 means you are ‘very willing to give up something today.’ Use the 
values in-between to indicate where you fall on the scale.” The Procrastinator Score is measured by the respondent’s 
answer to this question: “How well does the following statement describe you as a person? I tend to postpone things 
even though it would be better to get them done right away. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘does not 
describe me at all’ and a 10 means ‘describes me perfectly.’ Use the values in-between to indicate where you fall on 
the scale.” 
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To the database of survey module responses, we appended information on several 
important socioeconomic and demographic variables from the HRS Core dataset. 9  These 
included age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, religion, and an indicator of whether 
the respondent was relatively optimistic about his subjective life expectancy (compared to the 
relevant actuarial age/sex life table). The respondent’s cognitive score was also included as a 
control, following Dohmen et al. (2010, 2012) who found a positive correlation between 
impatience and cognition for a younger population. In addition we control for variables 
indicating that the respondent had been told by a doctor that he had cancer, lung disease, a heart 
condition, a stroke, or had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s or dementia. In some models we 
also control on (ln) household income.10   
In what follows, we first offer some descriptive statistics on the time discounting 
measures derived using the answers our older respondents provided to the HRS module 
questions. Next, we link the IRR measures to key outcome variables of interest in the HRS. For 
instance, we evaluate whether people who were more impatient by our measure ended up with 
less wealth in retirement, invested less in their own health via various preventive health 
behaviors, and were less likely to defer retirement.  
Time Discounting Among the Elderly: Results 
Figure 1 reports the distribution of measured discount rates, or internal rates of return 
(IRR), derived from the respondents’ answers to the questions described above. The mean 
                                                        
9 Most variables were taken from the RAND HRS datafile, though in a few cases we used the 2014 HRS wave 
which had not yet been integrated into the RAND file.  
10 Means of all variables appear in Appendix A, and more information on variable construction appears in the Online 
Appendices. 
 7 
(median) value of the IRR for our older population is 0.54 (0.58), with a minimum of 0.03, a 
maximum of 0.93, and a standard deviation of 0.35.11   
Previous studies have used samples that include younger individuals, and have typically 
found average discount rates that are somewhat lower than we observe for the elderly. For 
example, using a similar methodology to ours, involving choices between early and delayed 
monetary payments, Goda et al. (2015) found an average discount rate of 0.29 for the Rand 
American Life Panel and the Understanding America Study, both datasets that are intended to be 
representative of U.S. adults. Harrison et al. (2002) find an average discount rate of 0.28 in a 
representative sample of the Danish adult population, and Dohmen et al. (2012) reported an 
average discount rate in the range of 0.28 to 0.30 for a representative sample of German adults. 
Warner and Pleeter (2001) used a different methodology, involving much larger financial stakes 
than the typical experimental study: They estimated discount rates from the choices of members 
of the U.S. Army, between alternative pension schemes. They found a discount rate in the range 
of 0.10 to 0.19 for officers, and 0.33 to 0.50 for enlisted soldiers, more or less in line with the 
previously mentioned experimental studies. Previous studies have also found indications that 
IRRs increase over the life cycle (see Dohmen et al., 2012, and forthcoming), helping reconcile 
the higher discount rates that we observe among the elderly. An interesting open question is what 
might cause changing discount rates over the life cycle, something we turn to in later analysis. 
Notably, essentially all previous studies that estimate individual discount rates using 
experiments or intertemporal choices in other settings have reported estimated discount rates that 
were substantially higher than market interest rates. Such results contrast with the prediction of 
many economic models that people save only to earn interest, and market interest rates adjust 
toward rates of time preference. While the subject remains an area of debate, there are some                                                         
11 These are computed as described in Online Appendix B. In the paper, we report all IRR values compounded semi-
annually, since results are not particularly sensitive to different compounding periodicities.  
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reasonable explanations for the discrepancy. One could be a systematic tendency to overestimate 
time preference rates, although it is hard to explain the similarity of results across different 
methodologies. Another is that the motives behind purchases of financial assets, and the 
mechanisms determining interest rates, are not fully understood, particularly when time 
preferences are heterogeneous and correlated with other preferences and characteristics. 
Figure 1. Cumulative Distribution of Measured IRR Values for Older (70+) HRS 
Respondents  
 
 
 
Note: This figure reports the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of internal rates of return (IRR) for the N = 591 
respondents of a survey module implemented in the 2014 HRS. 
In Table 1 we report linear regressions of time discounting on personal characteristics. 
IRR is used in the first three columns, where we see a positive and statistically significant effect 
of age, on the order of about one point. Compared to the IRR mean of 54 points, this is about a 
two percentage point effect. While it is not enormous, it is economically meaningful, and it 
suggests that rates of impatience rise with age. Interpreted literally, a 15-year increase in age (say 
from 70 to 85) would raise the IRR by about a standard deviation. The magnitude is also quite 
 9 
robust to the inclusion of other controls, including sex, race/ethnicity, education, religion, 
optimism about longevity, health indicators, and income.    
 10 
Table 1. Correlates of IRR and Impatience Index Scores among Older HRS Respondents 
(OLS) 
 
Note: * Significant at the 01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *** Significant at 0.01 level. All models include 
missing value dummies as appropriate. 
Age 0.005 * 0.006 ** 0.007 ** 0.019 * 0.022 ** 0.022 *
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Male -0.005 0.025 0.026 0.155 0.223 0.220
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.136) (0.139) (0.140)
White -0.094 ** -0.088 ** -0.091 ** -0.335 * -0.312 -0.307
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.189) (0.190) (0.190)
Hispanic 0.088 * 0.075 0.077 0.152 0.104 0.101
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.217) (0.227) (0.227)
Education years -0.011 * -0.010 * -0.011 * -0.057 ** -0.054 ** -0.053 **
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Married -0.014 -0.031 -0.032 -0.053 -0.089 -0.085
(0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.130) (0.131) (0.140)
Cognition score -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.030 * -0.031 * -0.031 *
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Christian 0.024 0.048 0.054 0.033 0.129 0.119
(0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.286) (0.279) (0.282)
Jewish (0.021) (0.013) (0.007) 0.019 0.058 0.049
(0.107) (0.104) (0.104) (0.450) (0.451) (0.452)
Optimistic live to 85+ -0.013 -0.020 -0.019 -0.144 -0.154 -0.157
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127)
Have any cancer (0.077) ** (0.078) ** (0.251) * (0.248) *
(0.032) (0.032) (0.144) (0.145)
Have lung disease (0.006) (0.006) (0.204) (0.206)
(0.044) (0.045) (0.167) (0.169)
Have heart condition (0.059) ** (0.059) ** (0.098) (0.097)
(0.029) (0.029) (0.130) (0.131)
Have stroke 0.030 0.028 0.178 0.180
(0.044) (0.044) (0.212) (0.213)
Mental shortfall 0.188 *** 0.188 *** 0.118 0.120
(0.064) (0.064) (0.454) (0.455)
Ln(HH income) 0.003 (0.007)
(0.014) (0.066)
Intercept 0.429 * 0.332 0.285 0.123 -0.153 -0.063
(0.244) (0.246) (0.286) (1.059) (1.061) (1.222)
N 591 591 591 575 575 575
R-squared 0.084 0.117 0.119 0.075 0.092 0.092
Mean of dep. Var. 0.541 -0.011
Std.dev. of dep. Var. 0.345 1.324
IRR Impatience Index
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Results also show that whites have systematically lower IRRs than nonwhites, by about 
nine points (11 percent); there is no statistically significant differential effect for Hispanics, 
ceteris paribus. The more educated also have lower rates of impatience, such that one additional 
year of education is associated with a lower IRR of about one point (2 percentage points) – or 
roughly the same as a year of age. Interestingly, scoring higher on the cognitive ability12 measure 
had no impact on measured IRRs, controlling for education.13 Including household income does 
not change results, in contrast to Carvalho, Meier and Wang (2016) who focus on the poor and 
conclude that those who are cash-constrained are more present-biased.   
Adding controls for self-reported health problems, some of them severe enough to imply 
reduced life expectancy, boosts the explained variance (R-squared) by about half, and these 
additional variables prove to be statistically significant as well. For instance those who had been 
told they had cancer or a heart condition had 6-8 points higher IRRs, or 11-15 percent higher. 
Economic theory predicts that reduced life expectancy should increase discounting of the future, 
but empirical evidence has been scarce. One exception is Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey (2013), 
who study individuals diagnosed with Huntington’s disease at an early age; learning about the 
disease is associated with changes in behavior, such as choosing to retire earlier, which could 
reflect greater discounting of the future. Our sample of the elderly provides another opportunity 
to shed light on this question, but with direct measures of time discounting, and provides 
converging evidence with Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey (2013).  
We also find that IRRs are higher for individuals diagnosed with a mental condition 
(dementia or Alzheimer’s): IRRs are 19 points (35 percent) higher than average. The mechanism 
could potentially be reduced life expectancy, or it could reflect a systematic impact of dementia 
                                                        
12 The measurement of cognition in the HRS is detailed in Fisher et al. (2015).  
13 A number of other studies have studied how cognitive ability affects impatience, including Benjamin, Brown, and 
Shapiro (2013) and Dohmen et al. (2010), though not for the older population as here. 
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on decision-making. If dementia leads to more impatient choices, this has important implications 
for the outcomes of the elderly who are affected by this condition.  
The second three columns of Table 1 use the Impatience Index as the dependent variable, 
which is the normalized sum the IRR and the negative of the self-reported Future Oriented Score. 
The results are broadly similar to those based on using the IRR measure alone, in that ethnicity, 
education, mental acuity, and health conditions are all related to impatience in the same 
directions. There are some differences, for example in that cognitive ability is significantly 
related to the Impatience Index, while mental shortfall is not, the opposite of the findings for IRR. 
Also, having a heart condition is not significantly related to the Impatience Index.   
Associations between Time Discounting and Key Economic Behaviors 
Tables 2 through 5 show how our IRR and Impatience Index measures are associated 
with key outcomes of interest. These include respondents’ net wealth, a Healthy Behaviors 
Index,14 how well prepared people are for end of life contingencies, and retirement behaviors.  
For each outcome, we first regress it on the IRR (or the Impatience Index), and then we add the 
sociodemographic controls used above (age, sex, race/ethnicity, years of education, marital status, 
cognition score, religion, procrastinator score, and health controls). A final model in each case 
also included (ln) household income to evaluate whether the impatience variables are sensitive to 
its inclusion.    
                                                        
14 This is measured as the number of precautionary health practices undertaken by the respondent such as getting a 
flu shot, not smoking, not drinking to excess, and having the relevant gender-appropriate annual exams (e.g., 
prostate exams, Pap, and mammograms).  
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Table 2. Association of Financial Outcomes with IRR among Older HRS Respondents 
(OLS) 
 
Note: * Significant at the 01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *** Significant at 0.01 level. All models include 
missing value dummies as appropriate. 
   
IRR -534.253 *** -373.473 *** -374.553 *** -379.232 ***
(93.616) (82.211) (84.991) (83.064)
Impatience index -101.944 *** -69.083 *** -71.109 *** -70.453 ***
(19.822) (18.565) (19.123) (18.405)
Age -4.543 -5.249 -3.367 -6.020 -6.479 -4.595
(5.217) (5.544) (5.466) (5.591) (5.929) (5.857)
Male 4.473 17.149 20.415 8.679 20.393 26.997
(74.169) (80.868) (77.941) (75.613) (82.182) (79.154)
White 201.062 *** 208.650 *** 145.593 *** 207.460 *** 209.679 *** 153.888 ***
(39.157) (41.616) (42.608) (42.566) (45.370) (47.310)
Hispanic -48.914 -62.118 36.996 -73.406 -80.509 14.440
(74.061) (78.544) (85.164) (78.752) (83.382) (88.971)
Education years 24.212 ** 23.729 ** 12.923 21.549 * 22.466 * 11.644
(11.304) (11.404) (11.621) (11.998) (12.382) (12.494)
Married 214.471 *** 214.323 *** 103.489 205.885 *** 208.492 *** 100.887
(73.966) (75.943) (74.783) (75.654) (77.160) (75.658)
Cognition score 17.759 *** 17.334 *** 12.688 ** 18.292 *** 17.507 *** 12.935 **
(6.624) (6.558) (6.306) (6.707) (6.712) (6.389)
Christian -33.980 -57.751 -34.915 -50.100 -71.424 -50.172
(216.124) (225.440) (213.825) (217.257) (227.437) (215.542)
Jewish 865.607 821.139 811.538 879.778 836.961 827.451
(675.733) (661.748) (653.156) (681.508) (667.058) (659.946)
Procrastinator score -17.127 * -15.751 * -14.392 * -18.649 * -17.064 * -15.447 *
(9.020) (9.015) (8.667) (9.567) (9.609) (9.263)
Optimistic live to 85+ 10.605 20.117 23.421 2.272 13.090 15.990
(64.979) (65.332) (63.509) (67.826) (68.085) (66.153)
Have any cancer -55.829 -63.720 -75.605 -79.271
(66.461) (65.394) (65.939) (64.675)
Have lung disease -146.141 * -94.842 -150.682 * -98.390
(81.844) (79.866) (83.452) (81.598)
Have heart condition 56.267 58.323 77.853 79.832
(75.584) (73.656) (78.238) (76.348)
Have stroke 77.152 61.938 44.959 38.974
(121.505) (120.456) (125.591) (125.723)
Mental shortfall -240.937 -306.946 * -260.737 -347.245 *
(204.395) (180.615) (216.603) (190.215)
Ln(HH income) 177.980 *** 173.491 ***
(50.826) (50.291)
Intercept 728.558 *** 143.321 223.881 -1446.786 ** 439.801 *** 107.282 157.032 -1482.735 *
(75.790) (517.649) (536.524) (734.990) (33.748) (541.803) (562.036) (756.960)
N 582 582 582 582 566 566 566 566
R-squared 0.051 0.158 0.167 0.214 0.035 0.146 0.156 0.200
Mean of dep. vars 442.356 441.480
Std.dev. of dep. vars 816.981 820.749
Net wealth ($1,000)
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Table 3. Association of Health Index with IRR among Older HRS Respondents (OLS) 
 
Note: * Significant at the 01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *** Significant at 0.01 level. All models include 
missing value dummies as appropriate.   
IRR -0.303 ** -0.273 ** -0.274 **
(0.127) (0.131) (0.131)
Impatience index -0.056 ** -0.039 -0.039
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Age 0.039 *** 0.039 *** 0.038 *** 0.038 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Male -0.249 ** -0.249 ** -0.262 *** -0.263 ***
(0.099) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101)
White 0.071 0.073 0.091 0.091
(0.121) (0.122) (0.124) (0.124)
Hispanic 0.008 0.007 0.016 0.015
(0.151) (0.151) (0.149) (0.149)
Education years 0.023 0.024 0.030 * 0.030 *
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Married 0.105 0.109 0.126 0.127
(0.092) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098)
Cognition score 0.020 * 0.021 * 0.019 0.019
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Christian 0.207 0.207 0.189 0.189
(0.209) (0.209) (0.212) (0.212)
Jewish 0.087 0.087 0.053 0.053
(0.313) (0.314) (0.307) (0.308)
Procrastinator score -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Optimistic live to 85+ -0.115 -0.114 -0.126 -0.126
(0.087) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089)
Ln(HH income) -0.006 -0.001
(0.045) (0.046)
Intercept 3.453 *** -0.551 -0.499 3.287 *** -0.618 -0.608
(0.080) (0.760) (0.857) (0.043) (0.771) (0.864)
N 516 516 516 502 502 502
R-squared 0.011 0.102 0.102 0.007 0.098 0.098
Mean of dep. vars 3.291 3.287
Std.dev. of dep. vars 0.978 0.973
Health Index
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Table 4. Association of End of Life Index with IRR among Older HRS Respondents (OLS) 
 
 
Note: * Significant at the 01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *** Significant at 0.01 level. All models include 
missing value dummies as appropriate.  
IRR -0.599 *** -0.216 -0.199 -0.196
(0.164) (0.159) (0.162) (0.163)
Impatience index -0.150 *** -0.065 * -0.065 * -0.064 *
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Age 0.031 ** 0.027 ** 0.027 ** 0.031 ** 0.028 ** 0.028 **
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Male -0.136 -0.177 -0.178 -0.132 -0.166 -0.166
(0.114) (0.119) (0.119) (0.115) (0.119) (0.119)
White 0.563 *** 0.556 *** 0.549 *** 0.519 *** 0.511 *** 0.504 ***
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145)
Hispanic -0.718 *** -0.698 *** -0.678 *** -0.735 *** -0.715 *** -0.696 ***
(0.159) (0.163) (0.166) (0.157) (0.160) (0.163)
Education years 0.101 *** 0.100 *** 0.097 *** 0.100 *** 0.099 *** 0.098 ***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Married -0.284 ** -0.262 ** -0.302 ** -0.290 *** -0.267 ** -0.304 **
(0.110) (0.112) (0.122) (0.110) (0.113) (0.123)
Cognition score 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.023 * 0.022 0.020
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Christian 0.326 0.288 0.280 0.320 0.287 0.281
(0.256) (0.248) (0.252) (0.251) (0.245) (0.248)
Jewish 0.634 0.555 0.514 0.631 0.560 0.522
(0.504) (0.503) (0.505) (0.501) (0.503) (0.505)
Procrastinator score -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Optimistic live to 85+ -0.015 0.005 0.002 -0.015 0.003 -0.001
(0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.110)
Have any cancer 0.110 0.112 0.071 0.074
(0.117) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119)
Have lung disease -0.068 -0.046 -0.065 -0.046
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.154)
Have heart condition 0.167 0.161 0.168 0.164
(0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117)
Have stroke -0.068 -0.074 -0.082 -0.088
(0.155) (0.154) (0.159) (0.159)
Mental shortfall 0.302 0.282 0.411 * 0.383
(0.247) (0.241) (0.238) (0.234)
Ln(HH income) 0.053 0.049
(0.060) (0.060)
Intercept 1.973 *** -2.839 *** -2.560 ** -2.987 ** 1.645 *** -2.980 *** -2.695 *** -3.106 **
(0.105) (1.028) (1.028) (1.187) (0.057) (1.043) (1.039) (1.206)
N 487 487 487 487 479 479 479 479
R-squared 0.026 0.247 0.254 0.256 0.032 0.250 0.257 0.258
Mean of dep. var. 1.655 1.649
Std.dev. of dep. var. 1.264 1.265
End of Life Index
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Table 5. Association of Social Security Claiming Age and Difference between Expected and 
Actual Social Security Claiming Age, and Impatience among Older HRS Respondents 
(OLS) 
   
 
(cont) 
IRR -0.406 -0.443 -0.437 -0.414
(0.273) (0.287) (0.288) (0.288)
Impatience Index -0.055 -0.065 -0.054 -0.052
(0.068) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Age 0.092 *** 0.099 *** 0.097 *** 0.091 *** 0.097 *** 0.097 ***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Male 0.236 0.288 0.281 0.238 0.277 0.274
(0.204) (0.207) (0.208) (0.207) (0.211) (0.212)
White -0.273 -0.300 -0.302 -0.254 -0.287 -0.299
(0.307) (0.312) (0.316) (0.321) (0.327) (0.330)
Hispanic 0.556 * 0.483 0.489 0.519 0.443 0.452
(0.335) (0.344) (0.347) (0.336) (0.345) (0.347)
Education years 0.120 *** 0.120 *** 0.113 *** 0.120 *** 0.121 *** 0.116 ***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Married -0.019 -0.032 -0.093 -0.001 -0.012 -0.079
(0.202) (0.205) (0.222) (0.206) (0.210) (0.224)
Cognition score -0.041 -0.039 -0.043 * -0.040 -0.038 -0.042
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Christian -0.415 -0.456 -0.490 -0.421 -0.461 -0.483
(0.394) (0.413) (0.415) (0.394) (0.411) (0.414)
Jewish 1.103 1.141 1.044 1.095 1.124 1.027
(0.915) (0.884) (0.874) (0.907) (0.882) (0.873)
Procrastinator score -0.003 0.005 0.006 -0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Optimistic live to 85+ 0.182 0.154 0.144 0.197 0.171 0.158
(0.189) (0.191) (0.191) (0.192) (0.194) (0.194)
Have any cancer 0.152 0.164 0.176 0.188
(0.216) (0.216) (0.226) (0.226)
Have lung disease -0.200 -0.155 -0.206 -0.164
(0.258) (0.259) (0.265) (0.266)
Have heart condition -0.302 -0.300 -0.309 -0.306
(0.206) (0.206) (0.211) (0.211)
Have stroke -0.614 ** -0.611 ** -0.601 ** -0.600 **
(0.252) (0.250) (0.262) (0.260)
Mental shortfall -0.474 -0.544 -0.575 -0.651
(0.736) (0.758) (0.729) (0.751)
Ln(HH income) 0.092 0.097
(0.123) (0.124)
Intercept 63.622 *** 56.207 *** 55.879 *** 55.253 *** 63.410 *** 55.995 *** 55.693 *** 54.944 ***
(0.172) (1.901) (1.961) (2.177) (0.096) (1.947) (2.009) (2.244)
N 464 464 464 464 455 455 455 455
R-squared 0.005 0.098 0.122 0.125 0.002 0.092 0.116 0.119
Mean of dep. vars 63.404 63.411
Std.dev. of dep. vars 2.033 2.045
A. Age received Social Security
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Table 5 (cont) 
 
Note: * Significant at the 01 level; ** Significant at 0.05 level; *** Significant at 0.01 level. All models include 
missing value dummies as appropriate. 
 
IRR -0.039 -0.111 -0.136 -0.125
(0.370) (0.403) (0.409) (0.409)
Impatience Index -0.013 0.000 -0.006 -0.013
(0.090) (0.092) (0.095) (0.095)
Age 0.092 ** 0.090 ** 0.088 ** 0.090 ** 0.089 ** 0.087 **
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Male -0.159 -0.090 -0.142 -0.201 -0.135 -0.177
(0.304) (0.294) (0.296) (0.306) (0.297) (0.300)
White -0.289 -0.209 -0.148 -0.290 -0.211 -0.150
(0.389) (0.406) (0.407) (0.403) (0.423) (0.423)
Hispanic 0.424 0.268 0.219 0.397 0.253 0.206
(0.550) (0.559) (0.563) (0.551) (0.560) (0.564)
Education years 0.037 0.037 0.045 0.029 0.030 0.040
(0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
Married 0.112 0.069 0.182 0.156 0.105 0.224
(0.323) (0.324) (0.354) (0.324) (0.325) (0.355)
Cognition score 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.031 0.027 0.029
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045)
Christian 0.108 0.149 0.037 0.097 0.134 0.046
(0.503) (0.500) (0.507) (0.507) (0.506) (0.512)
Jewish -2.710 *** -2.781 *** -2.775 *** -2.691 *** -2.758 *** -2.736 ***
(0.960) (1.004) (1.009) (0.962) (1.011) (1.021)
Procrastinator score 0.029 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.030 0.029
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Optimistic live to 85+ 0.342 0.368 0.368 0.366 0.388 0.387
(0.283) (0.286) (0.287) (0.286) (0.289) (0.290)
Have any cancer -0.312 -0.329 -0.264 -0.276
(0.332) (0.331) (0.338) (0.337)
Have lung disease -0.643 -0.687 * -0.592 -0.656
(0.411) (0.409) (0.423) (0.423)
Have heart condition 0.080 0.075 0.051 0.056
(0.284) (0.284) (0.285) (0.286)
Have stroke 0.228 0.212 0.242 0.214
(0.308) (0.312) (0.324) (0.329)
Mental shortfall -2.136 *** -2.115 *** -2.201 *** -2.170 ***
(0.565) (0.600) (0.616) (0.653)
Ln(HH income) -0.131 -0.138
(0.165) (0.164)
Intercept -0.170 -8.408 ** -8.149 ** -6.753 * -0.188 -8.345 ** -8.199 ** -6.790 *
(0.248) (3.433) (3.500) (3.825) (0.134) (3.487) (3.545) (3.882)
N 349 349 349 349 343 343 343 343
R-squared 0.000 0.056 0.071 0.079 0.000 0.054 0.067 0.073
Mean of dep. vars -0.191 -0.188
Std.dev. of dep. vars 2.463 2.469
B. Actual - Expected Soc Sec Claim Age
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Net Wealth 
The first four columns of Table 2 show that, whether we hold other factors constant or 
not, there is a strong, statistically significant, and powerful relationship between respondents’ 
impatience measures and their net wealth (the latter is measured in thousands). Specifically, 
those with higher IRRs have lower wealth, and the coefficient magnitudes are large across all 
four columns. Focusing on the columns including controls, an IRR coefficient of around -375 
suggests that someone with an IRR one standard deviation above the mean would have 29 
percent less wealth than his counterpart at the mean (=0.35*375/442). Goda et al. (2013) found a 
large and significant correlation between time discounting and retirement wealth, for younger 
age groups, and Hurd and Rohwedder (2013) reported lower wealth for those indicating they had 
a short planning horizon. Our results are also consistent with the idea that discount rates 
measured in old age are relevant for explaining variation in retirement wealth. 
Smaller but significant negative coefficients are found for the Procrastinator score, while 
most health effects are not statistically significant. Interestingly, the education effect is positive 
and significant when household income is excluded. The White coefficient is also positive and 
consistently significant, suggesting that this group has more net wealth in older years even after 
conditioning on other controls. Moreover, estimated magnitudes are comparable to the IRR 
effect: that is, being White versus nonwhite is associated with having 32-48 percent more net 
wealth ($145-210/ 442). Overall, the models account for between 16-20 percent of variation in 
the IRR variable.  
On the right hand side of Table 2 we run similar regressions, but this time focus on the 
Impatience Index. The findings are very similar to those using the IRR. Individuals who are 
more impatience according to the index have significantly lower wealth.  
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Health 
We next turn to an examination of how the Healthy Behaviors Index varies according to 
the IRR and other factors. The first three columns of Table 3 include the IRR as the key variable 
of interest, and longer set of controls first excludes, and then includes, the (ln) of household 
income to investigate coefficient sensitivity. Results show that people having higher IRRs are 
less likely to engage in healthy behaviors, and the effects are statistically significant. 
Quantitatively, they are on the small side: for instance, an individual with a standard deviation 
higher IRR would have about 0.1, or 2 percent, more healthy behaviors than average 
(=0.27*0.35/3.3). 15  Chabris et al. (2008) document a relationship between IRRs and health 
behaviors for several samples of individuals with different age ranges, all much younger than our 
sample. Sutter and Kocher (2013) show similar results for high school age students. Our results 
show that IRRs also matter for health behaviors toward the end of life. We find that age also has 
a positive and significant coefficient in the regression explaining health behaviors, though the 
magnitude is again small. People with higher cognition scores also have more healthy behaviors 
as measured by our Index.  
The next three columns substitute the Impatience Index for the IRR. As shown in column 
4, individuals who are more impatient according to the index have significantly lower scores on 
the health index, similar to conclusions based on the IRR measure. The relationships are less 
precisely estimated and lose statistical significance, however, after controls are added to the 
regression in columns 5 and 6.    
                                                        
15 Our findings suggest that, while impatience is relevant for explaining heterogeneity in health behaviors, the 
contribution is modest in size. This could explain why incentives for health behaviors designed to counteract 
impatience by making present benefits larger do not have particularly long-lasting effects; see McConnell (2016). 
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End-of-Life Provision 
We are also interested in whether impatient people are also less likely to put into place 
appropriate precautions around their end of life challenges. Understanding decisions about end-
of-life care is important, given the large component of end-of-life care to health care costs in the 
U.S. (see De Nardi, French, and Jones, 2010). We provide some first evidence on whether 
variation in time discounting is relevant for such decisions, or whether they are mainly driven by 
other factors. Our End--f Life Index is a count of the number of affirmative responses each 
respondent gave to questions about whether he had long-term care insurance, assigned a power 
of attorney, a living will, and had discussed end-of-life medical care plans with others. The mean 
(median) value of this index is 1.7 (2), with a standard deviation of 1.3.  
Table 4 shows the results from our descriptive regressions. Our sample size is somewhat 
attenuated since almost 6 percent of the sample did not respond to all the questions comprising 
the End-of-Life Index.  The first column confirms a negative and statistically significant 
relationship of the IRR with the index, so it impatience is inversely related to taking health 
precautions around the end of life. Nevertheless the coefficient is attenuated and significance 
falls with the inclusion of other controls. Other significant relationships include the positive and 
significant effect of age, where 15 additional years of age would be associated with half a point 
increase in the End of Life score, or an improvement of 27 percent (from the mean of 1.7). 
Whites also score about 0.5-0.6 points higher than nonwhites (36 percent), while Hispanics score 
0.7 points (42 percent) lower than non-Hispanics, and both effects are strongly significant. The 
only other factor which is notably negative associated with making end-of-life provisions is 
being married, such that married individuals score 0.3 points (or 17 percent) below their single 
counterparts.    
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The next three columns substitute the Impatience Index for the IRR. In this case, the 
relationship between impatience and the end-of-life index remains statistically significant even 
with all controls in the regression. Overall, the findings indicate that variation in time 
discounting in old age is related to decisions about end-of-life care 
Retirement Behavior 
Next we turn to an examination of how retirement patterns vary across more, versus less, 
patient HRS respondents. Two outcomes are of interest in Table 5: Panel A investigates the age 
at which people initiated their Social Security benefits, or what is often termed the Social 
Security claiming age, while Panel B focuses on the difference between peoples’ actual Social 
Security claiming age and their expected claiming age.16 As before, the first of four models in 
each case includes only the impatience factor, and then we add additional controls culminating 
with the inclusion of (ln) household income. The goal once again is to evaluate the robustness of 
the results across models.  
The analysis in Panel A suggests that only age and education are positively and 
significantly associated with the respondent’s Social Security claiming age. Of the medical 
conditions, only having had a stroke is linked to lower claiming ages. The IRR measure, and the 
Impatience Index, are both associated with earlier claiming ages, as would be expected if more 
impatient people place less weight on earning money for future, post-retirement consumption, 
but these relationships are not statistically significant.  
Results in Panel B show that the IRR and Impatience Index are negatively associated 
with the difference between actual and expected claiming ages. Though the coefficients are not 
statistically significant in our sample, the most impatient people claimed earlier than expected, 
                                                        
16 The respondent’s expected claiming age is taken from the earliest reported HRS wave. Both analyses include only 
the subset of HRS respondents with nonmissing and nonzero actual and expected claiming  ages.  
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which is consistent with the preference reversal behavior of Rabin (2002), mentioned above. 
Beyond age, little else is associated with this difference other than being Jewish (negative and 
significant) and having been diagnosed with mental problems (also negative and significant).  
Our findings regarding retirement outcomes contrast to some extent with evidence from 
Schreiber and Weber (2016). They conducted an online survey with roughly 3,000 German 
newspaper readers, and found that a measure of present bias is associated with earlier retirement 
ages, and a greater discrepancy between planned and actual retirement age in the direction of 
retiring earlier than expected. One possible explanation for the difference is that they used a 
measure of present bias that has a different format from ours. Another possible explanation is 
that they used self-reported retirement age, such that respondents offered their own subjective 
definition of what it means to be retired. Our approach uses a more objective, although not 
necessarily better, approach to measuring retirement, namely Social Security claiming age. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications  
Recent policy discussions have focused on what interventions might be designed to 
address low savings rates (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2006), over-consumption of harmful goods 
such as smoking and drinking (Camerer et al., 2003), avoid poverty (Carvalho, Meier, and Wang, 
2016), increase financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), and avoid making financial 
mistakes over the life cycle (Agarwal et al., 2009).  Likewise there is substantial interest in 
finding ways to encourage people to delay retirement and thereby enjoy greater Social Security 
benefits in old age (Alleva, 2016; Maurer et al., forthcoming). Yet few studies have focused on 
older adults, impatience, and interesting wealth, health, and retirement behaviors. Accordingly, 
we fill this gap by exploring the extent of and factors associated with impatience in the older 
population.  
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Using a purpose-built module in the HRS, we use experimental elicitations of time 
preferences for money to show that the mean (median) value of the IRR for our older population 
is 0.54 (0.58), with a standard deviation of 0.35. These values are reasonable and confirm to an 
all-age survey conducted in Germany. Our IRR measures rise with age: Thus, a 15-year increase 
in age from 70 to 85 would be associated with about a standard deviation higher IRR. This result 
is robust to a variety of controls. We also show that Whites and the better educated have lower 
IRRs, while those with health conditions have 11-30 percent higher IRRs. Cognition scores are 
not statistically associated with our impatience measures. 
When we relate our impatience measures to outcomes of interest using multiple 
regression models, several interesting results emerge. Net wealth is significantly lower for the 
least patient, probably indicating that the least patient save less and, therefore, arrive at old age 
with fewer assets. We also find that the impatient are much less likely to engage in healthy 
behaviors and to have made provision for end-of-life challenges. And finally, our analysis shows 
that Social Security claiming ages are not significantly related to the IRRs, though impatience is 
associated with people claiming benefits earlier than anticipated.  
Our findings add to the literature on discounting behavior, as well as to the understanding 
of older persons’ decision processes. They also have implications for policy. For instance, the 
existence of widespread impatience among older Americans suggests that people may be willing 
to take less than actuarially fair incentives in exchange for working longer, particularly if they 
have access to lump sums. Increasing immediate rewards to other behaviors could also 
encourage choices such as investing in one’s health and making end of life decisions in advance 
of need.  
Future work can work can pursue some intriguing questions raised by our findings, about 
the determinants of time discounting. One concerns the explanation for an age effect on IRRs. 
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Since almost all data sets measuring IRRs are cross sectional, it has not been possible to 
disentangle cohort effects from effects of the aging process. Finding that IRRs vary with age in 
the relatively narrow age band of our sample casts some doubt on the cohort explanation, 
although the evidence is clearly not definitive. If it is the process of aging that affects IRRs, what 
is the specific mechanism? One possible mechanism is reduced survival probability, in line with 
the finding that diagnosis of serious health conditions is also associated with higher IRRs. The 
relationship between mental shortfall and IRRs also hints at a possible, unanticipated 
consequences of Alzheimer’s and similar conditions, in terms of systematic changes in decision-
making, something that calls for further study. 
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Appendix A. Variables Used in the Analysis 
Economic and Health Outcomes 
– Net Wealth (All household assets minus debt; includes house) 
– Health Index: sum of scores for had flu shot, as appropriate got mammo/Pap smear or 
prostate test; nonsmoker; healthy drinker (≤ 1 drink/day) 
– End of Life Index: sum of scores for had LTC, had living will, had disability care, had 
power of attorney 
– Impatience Index sum of normalized IRR and (the negative of) Future Oriented Score 
(the latter is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means R is “completely unwilling 
to give up something today" and a 10 means “very willing to give up something today”). 
– Age Received SocSec: Actual age claimed Social Security  
– Act-Expected SocSec Claim Age: Actual – expected (at baseline) Social Security claim 
age 
Preferences and Socio-Demographic Controls 
– Internal Rate of Return (IRR):  for definition see Appendix B   
– Procrastinator Score 
– Age 
– Male 
– Race/ethnicity  
– Education (years) 
– Married 
– Cognition Score 
– Christian/Jewish/other 
– Optimistic live to 85+ 
– Have cancer/lung disease/heart condition/stroke 
– Mental shortfall 
– Ln (HH income) 
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Appendix B. Descriptive stats for Key Variables  
 
 
  
Mean St.dev. Min Median Max
IRR 0.54 0.35 0.03 0.58 0.93
Net wealth ($1,000) 442 817 -260 192 7,919
Health Index 3.29 0.98 1 3 5
End of Life Index 1.66 1.26 0 2 4
Impatience index -0.01 1.50 -2.62 -0.01 3.38
Age Received SocSec 63.40 2.03 60 62.8 73.1
Act-Expected SocSec Claim Age -0.19 2.46 -14 0.1 9.1
Age 79.03 5.69 71 78 99
Male 0.38 0.48 0 0 1
White 0.84 0.36 0 1 1
Hispanic 0.10 0.30 0 0 1
Education years 12.37 3.25 0 12 17
Married 0.47 0.50 0 0 1
Cognition score 21.39 4.60 7 22 34
Christian 0.93 0.25 0 1 1
Jewish 0.02 0.13 0 0 1
Procrastinator score 4.75 3.44 0 5 10
Optimistic live to 85+ 0.54 0.50 0 1 1
Have any cancer 0.25 0.43 0 0 1
Have lung disease 0.13 0.34 0 0 1
Have heart condition 0.36 0.48 0 0 1
Have stroke 0.12 0.32 0 0 1
Mental shortfall 0.02 0.12 0 0 1
HH income ($) 44,618 63,219 0 28,372 677,645
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Online Appendix A. HRS Time Discounting Module 
Asked only of nonproxy respondents older than age 70  
 
V051_GIVEUP: FUTURE ORIENTED-- 0 TO 10 (HIGH) 
First, how do you see yourself -- are you a person who is generally willing to give up something 
today in order to benefit from that in the future, or are you not willing to do so? Please use a 
scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you are “completely unwilling to give up something today" 
and a 10 means you are “very willing to give up something today". Use the values in-between to 
indicate where you fall on the scale.  
Scale range 0-10:  
98. DK  
99. RF  
 
V052_INTRO: INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT CHOICES  
Now, suppose you were given the choice between receiving a payment today or a payment in 12 
months. We will now present to you 5 situations. The payment today is the same in each of these 
situations. The payment in 12 months differs in every situation. For each of these situations, we 
would like to know which you would choose.  
 
V053_100-154: 100 DOLLARS OR 154 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 154 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V069  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V054_100-125: 100 DOLLARS OR 125 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 125 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V062  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V055_100-112: 100 DOLLARS OR 112 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 112 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V059  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V056_100-106: 100 DOLLARS OR 106 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 106 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V058  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
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V057_100-103: 100 DOLLARS OR 103 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 103 Dollars in 12 months?   
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
V058_100-109: 100 DOLLARS OR 109 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 109 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084---------------------  
V059_100-119: 100 DOLLARS OR 119 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 119 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  GO TO V061  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V060_100-122: 100 DOLLARS OR 122 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 122 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084---------------------  
V061_100-116: 100 DOLLARS OR 116 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 116 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084---------------------  
V062_100-139: 100 DOLLARS OR 139 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 139 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V066  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V063_100-132: 100 DOLLARS OR 132 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 132 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY   GO TO V065  
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2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V064_100-129: 100 DOLLARS OR 129 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 129 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084---------------------  
V065_100-136: 100 DOLLARS OR 136 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 136 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084---------------------  
V066_100-146: 100 DOLLARS OR 146 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 146 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V068  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V067_100-143: 100 DOLLARS OR 143 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 143 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084---------------------  
V068_100-150: 100 DOLLARS OR 150 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 150 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
V069_100-185: 100 DOLLARS OR 185 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 185 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS   GO TO V077  
8. DK  
9. RF  
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V070_100-202: 100 DOLLARS OR 202 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 202 Dollars in 12 months?   
1. TODAY  GO TO V074  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
  
V071_100-193: 100 DOLLARS OR 193 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 193 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  GO TO V073  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V072_100-197: 100 DOLLARS OR 197 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 197 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
V073_100-189  
100 DOLLARS OR 189 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 189 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
V074_100-210: 100 DOLLARS OR 210 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 210 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS   GO TO V076  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V075_100-215: 100 DOLLARS OR 215 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 215 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
V076_100-206: 100 DOLLARS OR 206 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 206 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
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2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
V077_100-169: 100 DOLLARS OR 169 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 169 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V081  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V078_100-161: 100 DOLLARS OR 161 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 161 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V080  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V079_100-158: 100 DOLLARS OR 158 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 158 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
V080_100-165: 100 DOLLARS OR 165 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 165 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
V081_100-177: 100 DOLLARS OR 177 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 177 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  GO TO V083  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
 
V082_100-173: 100 DOLLARS OR 173 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 173 Dollars in 12 months?  
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK  
9. RF  
--------------------- GO TO V084 ---------------------  
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V083_100-181: 100 DOLLARS OR 181 DOLLARS  
Would you rather receive 100 Dollars today or 181 Dollars in 12 months?   
1. TODAY  
2. IN 12 MONTHS  
8. DK   
9. RF  
 
ASK EVERYONE   
V084_POSTPONER:  DO YOU POSTPONE 0 TO 10-HIGH  
How well does the following statement describe you as a person? I tend to postpone things even 
though it would be better to get them done right away. Use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
“does not describe me at all" and a 10 means “describes me perfectly". Use the values in-
between to indicate where you fall on the scale.  
Scale range 0-10: ______  
98. DK  
99. RF  
 
V085_LOTTERY: LOTTERY VS SURE PAYMENT AMOUNT  
IWER: Read slowly.  
Please imagine that you have won a prize in a contest. Now you can choose between two 
different payment methods, either a lottery or a sure payment. If you choose the lottery there is a 
50 percent chance that you would receive $1,000, and an equally high chance that you would 
receive nothing.  
What is the smallest sure payment that would make you prefer the sure payment over playing the 
lottery?  
Amount $ ___________ ($0-$99997)  
99998. DK  
99999. RF 
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Online Appendix B. Generating Patience Scores and Internal Rates of Return Measures 
from Our Survey Module 
This document explains how we calculate Patience Scores and Internal Rates of Return (IRR) for 
all respondents in our data, using responses to the HRS module described above.  
 
1. Patience Scores 
Respondents’ patience scores were elicited using the Survey Module (see Appendix A) and 
coding responses as follows, depending on the skip logic each person’s answers traced. 
 
 
 
  
154
185
125
202
169
139
112
210
193
177
161
146
132
119
106
215
206
197
189
181
173
165
158
150
143
136
129
122
116
109
103
Patience=1
Patience=2
Patience=3
Patience=4
Patience=5
Patience=6
Patience=7
Patience=8
Patience=9
Patience=10
Patience=11
Patience=12
Patience=13
Patience=14
Patience=15
Patience=16
Patience=17
Patience=18
Patience=19
Patience=20
Patience=21
Patience=22
Patience=23
Patience=24
Patience=25
Patience=26
Patience=27
Patience=28
Patience=29
Patience=30
Patience=31
Patience=32
336
254
250
82
69
184
192
59
38
44
34
35
83
100
179
11
22
37
18
20
7
36
16
18
14
21
58
24
43
58
173
8
6
5
15
6
15
22
7
11
4
16
5
2
9
27
10
6
9
9
6
8
9
12
27
29
10
14
27
15
17
41
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2. How We Computed the IRRs  
 
The annual Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the annual interest rate that makes it equally 
attractive to receive $100 now, or a larger amount $X in 12 months. If the interest rate is 
compounded once per year, the IRR satisfies this equation: 
 
(1+IRR)*$100 = $X 
 
 We can solve for the IRR as: 
 
IRR = ($X/$100) - 1 
 
With compounding twice per year, the annual IRR satisfies: 
 
(1+IRR/2)^2*$100 = $X 
IRR =2*[ [($X/$100) ^(.5)]- 1 ] 
 
With continuous compounding, the annual IRR satisfies: 
 
(e^IRR)*$100 = $X 
IRR = ln([($X/$100) 
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3. Inferring Respondents’ IRRs from Responses to Time Preference Questions: 
A respondent’s choices in the time preference questions reveal something about the size of 
delayed payment $Z, received in 12 months that would make him willing to give up $100 
received now. We cannot infer his exact $Z, but we infer lower and upper bounds for his true $Z. 
This in turn allows us to infer bounds for an individual’s IRR, i.e., the annual interest rate that 
solves (1+IRR)*$100 = $Z for that person. The patience score derived from the survey is given 
as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, suppose someone has a patience score of 25. In this case we know: 
$125 >= $Z >= $122. Thus, $Z is at least $122 and at most $125. If compounding occurred once 
per year, this means the person’s lower bound IRR is: IRRlower = ($122/$100) – 1 = 0.22. And 
the upper bound IRR is: IRRupper = ($125/$100) – 1 = 0.25. We take the midpoint to be the 
respondent’s IRR: IRR = (.22 + .25)/2 = 0.235. In the case of patience score of 1, we only have 
the lower bound, so we just use the lower bound. 
Patience score Size of delayed payment 
1 $Z >= $215 
2 $215 >= $Z >= $210 
3 $210 >= $Z >= $206 
4 $206 >= $Z >= $202 
5 $2062>= $Z >= $197 
6 $197 >= $Z >= $193 
7 $193 >= $Z >= $189 
8 $189 >= $Z >= $185 
9 $185 >= $Z >= $181 
10 $181 >= $Z >= $177 
11 $177 >= $Z >= $173 
12 $173 >= $Z >= $169 
13 $169 >= $Z >= $165 
14 $165 >= $Z >= $161 
15 $161 >= $Z >= $158 
16 $158 >= $Z >= $154 
17 $154 >= $Z >= $150 
18 $150 >= $Z >= $146 
19 $146 >= $Z >= $143 
20 $143 >= $Z >= $139 
21 $139 >= $Z >= $136 
22 $136 >= $Z >= $132 
23 $132 >= $Z >= $129 
24 $129 >= $Z >= $125 
25 $125 >= $Z >= $122 
26 $122 >= $Z >= $119 
27 $119 >= $Z >= $116 
28 $116 >= $Z >= $112 
29 $112 >= $Z >= $109 
30 $109 >= $Z >= $106 
31 $106 >= $Z >= $103 
32 $103 >= $Z >= $0 
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The next table shows computed IRRs given three frequencies of compounding: 
 
Summary of IRRs as a function of Patience Score and Frequency of Compounding 
 
Patience 
score 
Annual 
compounding 
Semi-annual 
compounding 
Continuous 
compounding 
32 0.03 0.03 0.03 
31 0.05 0.04 0.04 
30 0.08 0.07 0.07 
29 0.11 0.10 0.10 
28 0.14 0.14 0.13 
27 0.18 0.17 0.16 
26 0.21 0.20 0.19 
25 0.24 0.22 0.21 
24 0.27 0.25 0.24 
23 0.31 0.28 0.27 
22 0.34 0.32 0.29 
21 0.38 0.35 0.32 
20 0.41 0.37 0.34 
19 0.45 0.40 0.37 
18 0.48 0.43 0.39 
17 0.52 0.47 0.42 
16 0.56 0.50 0.44 
15 0.60 0.53 0.47 
14 0.63 0.55 0.49 
13 0.67 0.58 0.51 
12 0.71 0.62 0.54 
11 0.75 0.65 0.56 
10 0.79 0.68 0.58 
9 0.83 0.71 0.60 
8 0.87 0.73 0.63 
7 0.91 0.76 0.65 
6 0.95 0.79 0.67 
5 1.00 0.82 0.69 
4 1.04 0.86 0.71 
3 1.08 0.88 0.73 
2 1.13 0.92 0.75 
1 1.15 0.93 0.77 
 
 
